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The plaintiff/appellee, Ron Bellonio, pursuant to Rule 24 (b)
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, submits the following
Appellee's Brief.
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(k).

This is an interlocutory appeal

from an Order of the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt
Lake County, Utah, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson presiding.
That Order denied Salt Lake City's ("City") Motion to Dismiss.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues on appeal involve legal conclusions by the trial
court.

Those legal conclusions will be given no deference by this

Court and will be reviewed for legal correctness. T.R.F. v. Felan,
760 P.2d 138 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY AUTHORITY
The interpretation of the following statutory provisions is
determinative of the issues on appeal.

The language of these

designated statutes is set out in the Addendum to this Appellee's
Brief, pursuant to Rule 24 (f) (2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure:
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-11
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-13
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-14
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-15

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the case
This is a personal injury claim, alleging that the City

was negligent and that such negligence was the proximate cause of
Bellonio's injuries, sustained in a trip and fall in the parking
terrace at the Salt Lake International Airport on June 14, 1992.
B.

Course of Proceedings

The complaint was filed in the Third Judicial District Court
on June 14, 1994.

On December 26, 1994, defendants, Salt Lake

Airport Authority and Salt Lake City Corporation, moved the court
to dismiss this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b) (1) and 12(h) (2).

The court

dismissed the Salt Lake Airport Authority as a defendant because it
is a division of, and not a separate entity from, Salt Lake City
Corporation.

Salt Lake City Corporations motion to dismiss was

denied.
Pursuant to Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
Salt Lake City Corporation petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for
permission to appeal from the trial court's interlocurotry order.
On April 17, 1995, the Utah Supreme Court granted the petition and
poured over the case to the Utah Court of Appeals.
C.

Statement of Facts

In addition to the facts listed by the City in its Brief,
these additional facts are material.
1.

On June 14, 1992, Bellonio was injured when he tripped

and fell in the parking terrace at the Salt Lake International
2

Airport.

The City's "Medicial Assist Report" substantiates the

date of that injury.
2.

(R.44).

On July 9, 1992, Mr. Rex Curtis Bush, Attorney at Law,

who had been previously retained by Bellonio, corresponded with Mr.
Robert M. Kern, Attorney at Law, who was an attorney representing
the Airport Authority. Mr. Kern responded that he represented the
Authority and that communication should be directed to him. (R.45).
3.

On December 7, 1992, Mr. Edward D. Flint, Attorney at

Law, who had by that time been engaged by Bellonio relative to his
June 14, 1992 injuries, wrote a letter to Mr. Gene Jones of the
Salt Lake City Airport Authority, notifying the Airport Authority,
through Mr. Jones, that he, Mr. Flint, was Plaintiff's attorney at
that time (R.46).
4.

On December 14, 1994, Mr. Russell Pack, Salt Lake City

Airport Authority Property Manager, corresponded with Mr. Flint,
and

informed

him

that

all

further contact

with

the Airport

Authority in connection with Mr. Bellonio's claims should be
directed to the law firm of Kern and Wooley, in Los Angeles,
California.
5.
Attorney

(R.47).

Via letter dated December 22, 1992, Mr. Robert M. Kern
at

Law,

instructed

Mr. Flint

to direct

all future

correspondence relative to Bellonio's claims against the Airport or
City directly to Mr. Kern.
6.
City's

(R.48).

Mr. Flint, on Belloniofs behalf, and Mr.Kern, on the
behalf,

exchanged

further

correspondence

relative

Belloniofs claims in December, 1992 and January 1993.

3

to

(R.49-51).

7.

On March 24, 1993, Mr. Flint, on Bellonio's behalf, wrote

again to Mr. Kern, the City's representative, and set forth the
basis of Bellonio's claims against the Airport/City, including the
nature of Bellonio's
liability.

claims and his theories of the City's

At the same time, Mr. Flint sent to Mr. Kern a summary

of medical treatments and expenses, as well as copies of Bellonio's
to date medical bills.
8.

(R.52-53).

On June 11, 1993, Mr. Flint, for reasons unknown to

Bellonio and his current counsel, prepared and had Bellonio sign a
document entitled "Notice of Intent to Commence Legal Action. . .",
Mr. Flint then arranged for the mailing of the same document to the
persons

and

certificate.

entities

reflected

in

the

document's

mailing

(R.27-29).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Bellonio has fully complied with the notice provisions of the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

Both the March 24, 1993 letter

submitted to an agent of the City, as well as the formal Notice of
Claim submitted on June 11, 1993 satisfy those notice requirements.
The facts of this case, as well as Utah case law, support that the
individuals served are appropriate parties to serve under the
statute and represent those with authority to administer, control,
direct, and manage the affairs of the Airport Authority and the
City.
Bellonio has adequetly set forth in those notices the extent
of his damages.

All medical bills and records were in possession

of the City's agent at the time the notices were submitted.
4

The

injury is specifically designated in the Notice of Intent,

The

facts of this case and Utah case law support that Bellonio has
adequetely detailed his damages under the Act.
All purposes of the notice provisions of the Act have been
satisfied in this case. The early notice given by Bellonio of his
claim allowed the appropriate governmental entities to investigate
and evaluate the claim.

Informal discovery and exchange of

liability and medical documentation allowed for the review of the
claim to move forward quickly,

The trial court's denial of the

Cityfs Motion to Dismiss did not, in any way, subvert the purposes
of the Act.
Bellonio1s formal complaint was timely-filed. A governmental
entity may not unilaterally trigger the time limitations of the Act
by submitting a written denial of liability before a notice of
claim is filed. Such a procedure would allow a governmental entity
unilaterally to reduce, by almost half, the time requirements
allowed a claimant to pursue a claim under the Act. Whether based
on the March 24, 1993 letter or the June 11, 1993 Notice of Claim,
the plaintiff's complaint, filed on June 14, 1994, was timely under
the Act.
Finally, based on the facts of this case and Utah case law,
assuming, without admitting, technical defects in Bellonio's Notice
of Claim, the City has waived any such defects.

This waiver is

based on its continued negotiation, investigation, and evaluation
of the claim without any objection as to defective notice.

5

ARGUMENT
POINT I
BELLONIO FULLY COMPLIED WITH THE NOTICE OF
CLAIM PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY ACT
Before addressing the City's specific allegations of how
Bellonio's notice of claim filing was defective, a review of the
purpose of the notice requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act
("Act") is important.

As stated by the Utah Supreme Court in

Galleaos v. Midvale, 492 P.2d 1335 (1972), the notice requirements
of the Act are designed "to alert the public authority so that a
proper and timely investigation of the claim can be made." id. at
1337.

The City cannot argue that purpose was not accomplished in

this case.

Correspondence and the exchange of information and

documentation that went on even before the Notice of Claim was
filed is evidence of the extent of the investigation conducted by
the City.

In Scarborough v. Granite School District, 531 P.2d 480

(Utah 1975), the Supreme Court stated that full compliance with the
requirements of the notice of claim statute consists of:
. . .Prior to filing suite, a claim must be
filed which (1) is in writing, (2) states the
facts and the nature of the claim,
(3) is
signed by the claimant, (4) is directed and
delivered to someone authorized to receive it,
and (5) has been filed within the prescribed
time.
Bellonio fully complied with those provisions both in the
March 24, 1993 letter his then attorney Flint wrote to Mr. Kern,
and in the July 11, 1993 Notice of Claim.
was in writing.

Each of those documents

Each stated the facts and nature of Bellonio's

6

claims.

The March 24, 1993 letter was signed by Belloniofs then

attorney.

The June 11, 1993 Notice of Claim was signed by

Bellonio.

Both documents were mailed to Mr. Kern, who had

previously represented on numerous occassions to Bellonio and his
representatives that he was authorized to receive "all future
correspondence" related to the claim.

In three separate letters,

Bellonio was directed to submit all future correspondence to Mr.
Kern, the authorized agent of the City.
Bellonio

has

fully

requirements of the Act.

complied

with

the

notice

of

claim

The trial court was correct in denying

the City's Motion to Dismiss.

Now to address the specific

allegations of the City as to why Bellonio did not comply with the
notice provisions of the Act.
A.

Bellonio Has Complied With The Act By Serving
The Notice Of Claim Upon Roger Cutler, City
Attorney; Louis Miller, Director Salt Lake
City Airport Authority, And RM Kern, Attorney
For The Airport Authority.

The City does not argue that Bellonio is guilty of no
compliance with the notice of claim requirements of Utah Code Ann.
§63-30-13.

The City does not argue that the June 11, 1993 Notice

of Claim was untimely, except as will be addressed later. The City
argues defective compliance with the notice of claim requirements,
first, because

the Notice of Claim was not

filed

with the

"governing body" of the City. Bellonio served his Notice of Claim
upon Roger Cutler, City Attorney, Salt Lake City Corporation; Louis
Miller, Director, Salt Lake City Airport Authority; and R.M. Kern,
Esq., Designated Attorney for the Airport Authority.
7

The City

argues that service on these individuals cannot be deemed service
on the "governing body" of the political subdivision, whether that
subdivision be the Airport Authority or the City.
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-13 provides that a claim against a
political subdivision is barred unless notice of claim "is filed
with the governing body of the political subdivision within one
year after the claim arises. . . . "

Decisions of this Court and

Utah statutes support that, under the circumstances of this case,
Bellonio has satisfied the notice of claim requirements of Utah
Code Ann. §63-30-13. Utah Code Ann. §68-3-2 provides, in pertinent
part, as follows:
The rule of the common law that statutes in
derogation thereof are to be strictly
construed has no application to the statutes
of this state.
The statutes establish the
laws of the state respecting the subjects to
which they relate, and their provisions and
all proceedings under them are to be liberally
construed with a view to effect the objects of
the statutes and to promote justice.
Nowhere in the Governmental Imunity Act is the term "governing
body" of a political subdivision defined. The City attempts to use
a definition of "governing body"

set forth in the Utah Municiple

Code, Utah Code Ann. §10-1-101 et seq.

Utah Code Ann. §10-1-104,

however, makes it clear that the definition of "governing body" is
limited to "as used in this act".

Nowhere in the Utah Municiple

Code or in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act has the legislature
stated

that

the definition of

"governing

body"

in the Utah

Municipal Act is applied when construing the term "governing body"
as it applies to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Certainly, if
8

the legislature had intended for that definition to apply, it could
easily have said so.

The legislature could just as easily have

defined "governing body" in the Governmental Immunity Act itself.
The legislature has not done that.

In that regard, this case is

most similar to the decision of this Court in Brittain v. State of
Utah, 882 P.2d 666 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
In Brittain, the plaintiff pursued claims against the Utah
Department

of

Employment

Security

and

Facilities, Construction, and Management.

the Utah

Division of

Brittain filed notices

of claim under Utah Code Ann. §63-30-12 with the Attorney General
and the Division of Risk Management.

The State filed a motion to

dismiss on the ground that Brittain had failed to file a notice of
claim with either the Department of Employment Security or the
Division of Facilities, Construction, and Management, as required
by the Governmental Immunity Act.

The statute provides that a

notice of claim be filed with the Attorney General and "the agency
concerned".

Addressing that issue, this Court stated:

Because the term "agency concerned" is not
clear on its face, we will interpret the
notice requirement of section 63-30-12 in a
manner consistent with the overall purpose of
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
As
explained by the Utah Supreme Court "[i]t is
necessary to consider the policy of the notice
requirement so that in any particular case the
facts can be evaluated to determine if the
intent of the statute has been accomplished."
Stahl v. Utah Transit Authority, 618 P.2d 480,
482 (Utah 1980).
The primary purpose of a notice of claim
requirement is to afford the responsible
public authorities an oportunity to pursue a
proper and timely investigation of the merits
of a claim and to arrive at a timely

settlement, if appropriate, thereby avoiding
the expendeture of public revenue for costly
and
unnecessary
litigation."
(Citations
omitted).
Id, at 668.
Like the term "governing body", the term "agency concerned" in
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-12 is not defined in the statute. This Court
turned to the commonly understood dictionary meaning, "interested"
and concluded that the statutory notice of claim requirement was
met by filing notice "with any one of potentially several agencies
with a legitimate interest in plaintiff's claim and the legal
proceedings which might result therefrom."
In

an

important

final

paragraph,

3j|. at 668.
in

language

directly

applicable to the facts of this case on appeal, this Court
concluded:
Finally, we wish to reiterate that this is not
a case where the notice of claim was defective
in form or content. Recognizing the need for
written notice to protect against the
unreliability of memory, the notice of claim
was preserved in writing, accurately recording
Brittain's account of the accident. This is
also not a case where plaintiff either gave no
notice or filed only one of two required
notices. . . Finally, this is not a case where
notice of claim was not filed within the oneyear period. It is undisputed that plaintiff
sent both notices well within one year from
the date his claim arose.
Id. at 669
Those same facts exist in this case.

While there are some

factual differences between this case and the Brittain case, the
reasoning of that case controls these facts.
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The major difference between this case and the Brittain case
is that this case involves a claim against a political subdivision,
as opposed to a claim against the State.
requires

that

when

pursuing

a

claim

The language of the Act
against

a

political

subdivision, the notice of claim is to be filed "with the governing
body of the political subdivision." As mentioned before, the term
"governing body" is not defined in the Act.

Common dictionary

meaning of the word "govern" includes the terms "administer",
"direct", "control", and "manage". Websters New World Dictionary,
Second College Edition, p.604 (1979).
Just as a corporation can only act through individuals,
service upon any "governing body" must be made upon an individual.
In this case, service was made on Roger Cutler, the City Attorney
for Salt Lake City Corporation; on Louis Miller, Director of the
Airport Authority; and upon R.M. Kern, Esq., the attorney for the
Airport Authority.

Certainly, service upon those individuals and

the organiztions they represent constitutes service on those with
power to administer, direct, control, and manage the interests of
the City and the Airport Authority generally and, specifically,
with regard to this personal injury claim.

In a letter dated July

22, 1992, to Bellonio's then attorney Rex Bush, Mr. Kern states "we
represent the Salt Lake City Airport Authority and your letter
dated July 9, 1992, concerning the captioned claimant, has been
forwarded to us for response. . . Please communicate directly to
this office."

(R.45).

On December 22, 1992, Mr. Kern sent a

letter to Bellonio's then attorney Edward Flint stating "we act as
11

Salt Lake City Airport Authoritiy!s counsel.

Please direct all

future correspondence directly to this office."

(R.48).

On

January 4, 1993, Mr. Kern sent another letter to Mr. Flint stating
"you are correct, as indicated in our letter of 22 December 1992,
that all future correspondence should be directed to this firm."
(R.51).
It is clear from that correspondence that Kern had been
assigned responsiblity for this claim by the Airport Authority and
the City and was acting as their authorized agent.

Bellonio was

consistently instructed to direct all correspondence to Mr. Kern,
as agent for the political subdivisions.

In addition to sending

the Notice of Claim to Mr. Kern, Bellonio also sent the Notice of
Claim to the Director of the Airport Authority and the Attorney for
Salt Lake City Corporation.
The facts and circumstances of Belloniofs service of the
Notice of Claim, coupled with the reasoning of this Court in
Brittain, make it clear that Bellonio?s Notice of Claim service
satisfies the requirements of Utah Code Ann, §63-30-13. The trial
court's denial of the City's Motion to Dismiss should be affirmed.
B.

Belloniofs Damages Are Adequetly Set Forth In
The March 24, 1993 Notice And The June 11,
1993 Notice Of Claim.

The City next argues that Belloniofs notice is fatally flawed
because it does not set forth a recitation of his damages. The Act
requires simply that the claimant set forth "the damages incurred
by the claimant so far as they are known."
11.
12

Utah Code Ann.§63-30-

On March 24, 1993, Edward Flint, then counsel for Bellonio,
sent a letter to Mr. Kern specifically outlining liability issues
and providing a synopsis of Belloniofs medical records and medical
bills.

(R. 52-53).

That document itself satisfies all notice of

claim requirements in this case. The June 11, 1993 Notice of Claim
specifically states that "plaintiff then tripped over a curb as he
reached the end of the crosswalk, fell and hit the pavement,
sustaining injuries to his body as described by his medical
providers."

The specific documentation of the medical providers

had been supplied to Mr. Kern two and a half months earlier. Under
the circumstances, the statute's requirement that the claims set
forth damages "so far as they are known" has been satisfied.
The City's hypertechnical reading of the Act is not supported
by decisions of the Utah Supreme Court. In Tooele Meat and Storage
Co. v. Morse, 43 Utah 515, 136 P. 965, 966 (1913), the Supreme
Court acknowledged that "the general rule with respect to notices
is that mere informalities do not vitiate them so long as they do
not mislead, and give the necessary information to the proper
parties."

In Hurley v. Town of Bingham, 63 Utah 589, 228 P. 213

(1924), a case decided under formal law but still applicable
precedent, the guardians of an 8-year old minor brought an action
to recover for injuries sustained by the minor on one of the
streets of the town of Bingham. The plaintiff was required to file
a statutory notice of claim.

In the course of its opinion, the

Supreme Court made these observations applicable to this case:

13

After all, as we conceive the purpose of the
law, when the injured party has presented his
claim stating the time, place, cause and
circumstances of his injury and the extent of
his damage as far is as known to him, he has
fairly and fully complied with the spirit and
intent of the statute. But this is a far cry
from excusing the failure to present any
underlying claim at all within the limit fixed
by law. There is a wide distinction between
presenting a defective claim which at least
names the place, time, and circumstances of
the injury and in presenting no claim at all.
In the first supposed case the municipality is
at least notified sufficiently to investigate
the merits of the claim, which, evidentally is
the main purpose of the statute.
In the
second supposed case the city receives no
notice at all, and the very purpose of the
statute is defeated.
Id. at 214-15
In this case, the City has been on notice of this claim
virtually from the claim's inception and was in actual possession
of medical bills and records well before the filing of the document
titled Notice of Claim. The fundamental purposes and objectives of
the notice requirements have been met.
In Spencer v. Salt Lake City, 17 Utah 2d 362, 412 P.2d 449
(1966), decided under former law but still applicable, a claim
which stated the time, place, and nature of the injury and the
sidewalk defect causing it, fulfilled the purposes of the former
statute, even though the amount of damages was not stated.

The

former law required the claim to be filed within thirty days and
the Spencer court found that the damages were impossible to
assertain within that period of time.

In this case, although the

exact amount of damages was not set forth, because the full extent
of damage was not known at the time, the injury was listed and
14

actual medical expenses and bills had been provided to the City's
agent. The City was clearly informed of the damages incurred up to
that time by Bellonio.
Bellonio was adequately complied with the statutory provision
to identify his damages.

The trial court's denial of the City's

motion to dismiss on that ground should be affirmed.
C.

All Purposes Of The Governmental Immunity Act
Have Been Satisfied In This Case

The City next argues that the trial court' s denial of its
Motion to Dismiss creates a standard of less than strict compliance
with the Governmental Immunity Act and, therefore, defeats the
purpose of the Act.

The facts of this case defeat that argument.

The City lists the purposes of the Act as (1) to allow the
responsible government authority to promptly investigate and settle
a claim before litigation;

(2) to make the authority aware that a

plaintiff actually intends to assert a claim; and

(3) to protect

against the passage of time obscuring memory and distorting a
plaintiff's recollection of the events which were at the heart of
the claim.
It cannot seriously be disputed by the City that all of those
purposes have been satisfied in this case.

Bellonio notified the

City of his claim long before he was required to file any formal
Notice of Claim.

The City began its investigation early on.

Bellonio provided medical documentation and liability analysis
through appropriate channels. The City seems to fault Bellonio for
requesting discovery before filing the Notice of Claim.
wrong with that?

What's

Shouldn't the parties try and exchange as much
15

relevant information as possible before going through the formal
statutory procedures which ultimately lead to litigation?
The City's entire argument that the trial court's ruling
somehow subverts the purposes of the Act is unfounded.

The trial

court's ruling was proper and confirmed that all purposes of the
Act have been served under the facts of this case.
POINT II
IF THE COURT FINDS THAT BELLONIO'S MARCH 23,
1993 CORRESPONDENCE CONSTITUTES NOTICE OF HIS
CLAIM, THE CITY'S DECEMBER 22, 1992 DENIAL OF
LIABILITY STILL HAS NO EFFECT UNDER THE ACT.
The City's final argument is that if Bellonio's March 23, 1993
correspondence satisfies the notice provisions of the Act, then Mr.
Kern's

December

22, 1992

letter,

denying

liability

for

the

incident, triggered the one year period within which Bellonio had
to file his formal complaint.
of.

Nowhere

governmental

in

the

Act

That argument is quickly disposed
is

there

entity to unilaterally

a

provision

trigger

allowing

any of the time

limitations of the Act before a notice of claim is filed.
procedure would turn the Act upside-down.

a

Such a

It would allow a

governmental entity to receive a letter of representation from a
claimant's attorney, without the filing of any Notice of Claim, and
then immediately deny the claim in writing.

The governmental

entity could then argue that the claim is barred one year after
that written denial. At the same time, under the Act, the claimant
would have that first year within which to file a notice of claim;
then the period for the denial in writing or the ninety day denial
period; and then have an additional year to file the complaint.
16

Under the City's argument, a governmental entity could unilaterally
cut by almost half the time within which a claimant may pursue a
governmental claim under the Act.
The specific language of the Act unravels the City's argument.
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-14 provides as follows:
Within ninety days of the filing of a claim
the governmental entity or its insurance
carrier shall act thereon and notify the
claimant in writing of its approval or denial.
A claim shall be deemed to have been denied if
at the end of the ninety-day period the
governmental entity or its insurance carrier
has failed to approve or deny the claim.
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-15 (2) provides, in pertinent part, as
follows:
(2) The claimant shall begin the action within one
year after denial of the claim or within one
year after the denial period specified in this
chapter has expired. . . .
The only possible Notices of Claim at issue in this case are
the March 24, 1993 letter and the June 11, 1993 Notice of Claim.
It is undisputed that there was no formal denial in writing issued
by the City after either of those dates.

As such, the one year

period for filing a formal complaint began to run ninety days after
each of those notices were served. If the March 24, 1993 letter is
deemed notice, the plaintiff had until June 24, 1994 to file his
formal complaint. That complaint was filed on June 14, 1994 (R.29).

Based on the June 11, 1993 Notice of Claim, and the lack of

written denial after that Notice of Claim, the plaintiff had until
September 11, 1994 to file his formal complaint. Under either fact
situation, the June 14, 1994 complaint was timely-filed.
17

POINT III
THE CITY HAS WAIVED COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE
OF CLAIM REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH CODE ANN, §6330-13
The record in this case indicates an ongoing negotiation
regarding the claim, with informal exchanges of discovery requests
(R.49-50),

requests by the City

engineering
submission

consultants and
of

detailed

for reports

safety experts

liability

analysis

from Bellonio's
(R.54),
and

all

and the
medical

documentation (R.52-53).
Under those circumstances, decisions of the Utah Supreme Court
support that, even assuming, without admitting, that Bellonio's
Notice of Claim was somehow technically defective, the City has
waived any defect.

As stated by the Utah Supreme Court in Bowman

v, Oaden City, 93 P.561, 564 (Utah 1908):
The plaintiff's claim was not properly made
out as provided by the statute in several
particulars, principally, because it was not
verified, and the extent of his injury or
damage not sufficiently described. The city
council, however, did not decline to consider
it, nor to investigate the facts, because the
claim was not properly made out.
On the
contrary it treated the claim, and acted upon
it, as though it had been in full compliance
with the statute. In such case the defects of
the claim presented were waived, and were not
thereafter available as a defense to the
action.
For those reasons, even if this Court rejects Points I and II
of this Brief, any technical defect in Bellonio's compliance with
the notice of claim requirements of Utah Code Ann. §63-30-13 have
been waived by the City.
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CONCLUSION
Bellonio has complied with the notice of claim requirements of
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-11 et seq. Under the circumstances, the
notice of claim was served upon the appropriate entities designated
by the statute, Bellonio's damages were sufficiently set forth, and
the purposes of the statute have been satisfied.

The complaint in

this case was timely-filed, as the one year period within which to
file a complaint cannot unilaterally be triggered by the City's
written denial of liability submitted before a notice of claim is
filed.

Finally, even assuming, without admitting, technical

defects in Bellonio's notice of claim, the City has waived any such
defect by its ongoing active participation in the investigation,
evaluation, and negotiation of Bellonio's claim.
Based on the above argument and authorities, the trial court
did not err in denying the City's Motion to Dismiss.

That trial

court Order should be affirmed and this case remanded to the trial
court to proceed on the merits.
DATED this

day of August, 1995.
LEHMAN, JENSEN & DONAHUE, L.C.

GORDON K. JENSEN
Attorneys for Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that two true and correct copies of the
foregoing Brief of Appellant were mailed, first class postage prepaid to the following this

day of August, 1995.
Roger H. Bullock
STRONG & HANNI
600 Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

20

ADDENDUM

63-30-11. Claim for injury — Notice — Contents — Service
— Legal disability.
( D A claim arises when the statute of limitations that would apply if the
claim were against a private person begins to run.
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or
against an employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance
of his duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority shall
file a wiitten notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an action,
regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental.
(3) (a; The notice of claim shall set forth:
(i) a brief statement of the facts;
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are
known,
tb) The notice of claim shall be:
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that person's agent.
attorney, parent, or legal guardian: and
(ii) directed and delivered to the responsible governmental entity
according to the requirements of Section 63-30-12 or 63-30-13.
(4) (a> If the claimant is under the age of majority, or mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian at the time the claim arises, the claimant may apply to the court to extend the time for service of notice of
claim.
(b) (i) After hearing and notice to the governmental entity, the court
may extend the time for service of notice of claim.
(ii) The court may not grant an extension that exceeds the applicable statute of limitations.
to In determining whether or not to grant an extension, the court shall
consider whether the delay in serving the notice of claim will substantially prejudice the governmental entity in maintaining its defense on the
merits.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, §11; 1978, ch.
27, § 5: 1983, ch. 131, § 1; 1987, ch. 75, § 4;
1991, ch. 76, $ 6.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment. effective April 29. 1991, added the sub-

section designations in Subsection (3nb) and
made related changes and deleted "or impnsoned" after "legal guardian" and made related
changes in Subsection (4)(a).

63-30-13. Claim against political subdivision or its employee — Time for filing notice,
A claim against a political subdivision, or against its employee for an act or
omission occurring during the performance of his duties, within the scope of
employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is
filed with the governing body of the political subdivision withm one year after
the claim arises, or before the expiration of any extension of time granted
under Section 63-30-11, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise
to the claim is characterized as governmental.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, * 13; 1978, ch.
27, * 7; 1983, ch. 131, * 3; 1987, ch. 75, * 6.
Cross-References. — Actions arising out of
contractual rights or obligations not subject to
this section. * 63-30-5

Mailing claims to state or political subdivisions * 63-37-1 et seq

63-30-14. Claim for injury — Approval or denial by governmental entity or insurance carrier within
ninety days.
Within ninety days of the filing of a claim the governmental entity or its
insurance carrier shall act thereon and notify the claimant in writing of its
approval or denial. A claim shall be deemed to have been denied if at the end
of the ninety-day period the governmental entity or its insurance carrier has
failed to approve or deny the claim.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 14.

63-30-15. Denial of claim for injury — Authority and time
for filing action against governmental entity.
(1) If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action in the district
court against the governmental entity or an employee of the entity.
(2) The claimant shall begin the action within one year after denial of the
claim or within one year after the denial period specified m this chapter has
expired, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is
characterized as governmental.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, * 15: 1983, ch.
129, * 6; 1985, ch. 82. * 2; 1987, ch. 75, * 7.

FLINT & CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys at Law

EDWARD D. FLINT
PAUL R. CHRISTENSEN

March 2 4 ,

1993

Robert Kernf Esq.
Kern & Woolley
10920 Wilshire Blvd.
Los Angeles, CA 90024
Re: My Client:
Ronald Bellonio
Date of Loss: 6/14/92
Your Client:
Salt Lake City Airport Authority
Dear Mr. Kern:
It has been some time since we last corresponded.
In
reviewing this file in preparation for filing a Notice of Intent
to commence a legal action against a political subdivision of the
State of Utah, I have noticed that youf on behalf of Salt Lake City
Airport Authority, have denied that there is any legal liability
imposed on your client. I have enclosed with this letter some
information that would, as per your request, be considered facts
to the contrary.
In the most simple terms, the Airport Authority, and any other
private or public building, organization, or entity with a massive
parking area such as this where there are numerous entrances and
exits to and from the buildings and the parking area, and where
tens of thousands of people are expected to walk through and across
the various points and across the various surfaces and structures,
there is an affirmative duty to meet basic standards of
construction and safety. One of those standards is to mark all
curbs rising from street level at the point where the curb or
elevated sidewalk intersects with a crosswalk which connects a
building to a parking lot, across a roadway, for which pedestrians
are expected to utilize in order to maintain uniformity of
pedestrian and automobile traffic, and for the common safety of
all. In this particular case, the curb rises from the street level
where the crosswalk is, straight up approximately four inches from
the street level, and has a wheelchair access area in the middle
of the intersecting curb. The wheelchair access is approximately
half the total width of the area of the crosswalk which intersects
the curb. The remaining half of the crosswalk, with approximately
one-fourth on either side of the wheelchair access, does not lower

3760 South Highland Dr. • Suite 500 • Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
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to street level, and a wheelchair would have a difficult time going
over this four-inch curb, regardless of the direction that the
wheelchair pedestrian was traveling.
Under these circumstances, the curb that rises back up to the
four inches above street level point should be marked or painted
in a bright color — as I understand, it should be painted yellow - in order to warn pedestrians that it is at a different level than
the portion of the curb which intersects the crosswalk and it has
been lowered to street level for wheelchair access.
It is our contention that Mr. Bellonio was exiting the
airport, had his arms filled with his baggage and was properly
walking in the marked crosswalk area to reach his automobile when
he was unable to see that part of the curb that intersects with
the marked crosswalk was actually a four-inch high curb instead of
a lowered flat "driveway or ramp" type of egress, and at that time,
he tripped over the four-inch curb, fell and was seriously injured.
It xs very reasonable to assume that an individual carrying luggage
cannot see very well in areas where the luggage may be obstructing
their vision and could not be expected to see that there was a curb
that he would have to step up upon in order to avoid tripping over.
There were no signs posted warning hi*n to step up, and the curb was
not painted, which allowed the concrete curb that was four inches
high to blend in and disappear with the lower part that was
designed differently for wheelchair access.
My engineering consultants and safety experts have advised me
that this neglect on the part of the Airport Authority to have this
curb properly marked is negligence, and that the Airport Authority
should be held liable and responsible for the injuries sustained
by Mr. Bellonio. I must ask you the converse of your earlier
question, "What evidence do you have to the contrary that would
indicate that the Airport Authority has no liability?"
I have also included with this letter a synopsis of my
client's medical expenses incurred to date, and copies of bills
that are currently in my possession. Please respond in writing
with either an offer to settle, an offer to accept liability and
submit this matter to binding arbitration for the determination of
damages, or a denial of liability, within two weeks of the date of
this letter. If I do not hear from you, I will go ahead and file
the required Notice of Intent to Commence Action, which is required
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 63-30-10, et. seq. I would be
happy to answer any questions you may have concerning this claim.
Very truly yours,

EDWARD D. FLINT
EDF:fmw

RONALD F. BELLONIO
Pro Se Plaintiff
P.O. Box 571296
Murray, Utah 84157
Telephone: 649-6832

JUN | 4 1993

RONALD F. BELLONIO,
Plaintiff,
vs.

SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION
and the SALT LAKE CITY :
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
AUTHORITY, political subdivisions of the STATE OF UTAH

NOTICE OF INTENT TO
COMMENCE LEGAL ACTION
AGAINST THE STATE OF UTAH
OR ONE OF ITS POLITICAL
SUBDIVISIONS
(U.C.A. 63-30-11)

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

)

) : ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
1.
GENERAL NATURE AND DESCRIPTION OF CLAIM- On June 14,
1992, Plaintiff was leaving the Salt Lake City International
Airport Terminal One with his luggage in hand, and was walking
from the terminal to the parking terrace which had recently been
completed. Plaintiff walked from the sidewalk onto a crosswalk
painted on the through lane of traffic between the doors of the
walkway leading to Terminal One and the main parking area. He
entered the crosswalk from the sidewalk at street level and
walked to the other side of the road, staying only and always
completely within the crosswalk. Plaintiff then tripped over a
curb as he reached the end of the crosswalk, fell and hit the
pavement, sustaining injuries to his body as described by his
medical providers. Plaintiff could not see the curb because it
blended in with the wheelchair access which lowered the sidewalk
and curb to street level in the center of the crosswalk. Plaintiff expected that the crosswalk would connect with the curb and
sidewalk at street level, as it had where he entered the crosswalk, but in fact, the crosswalk only intersected at street level
with a portion of curb and sidewalk which was substantially
1

smaller than the width of the painted crosswalk. The curb was
not marked in any manner, was not painted, was not made to look
different than the area which did intersect the crosswalk at
street level, and there were no other warnings or advisements
present.
This accident was investigated by the Airport Operations
Division
which concluded in its written report, Case No. 92-1242
that MThe curb is in need of proper markings." Subsequently, the
curbs were painted yellow and are more visible to pedestrians.
THIS NOTICE is served upon the defendants, their agents or
attorneys, pursuant to the requirements of Utah Code Ann. 63-3011 by Certified Mail, return receipt requested.
DATED this

/ / • *

Jo a^e

day of

VJ

1993,

<C.

Ronald F. "Bellbnio
Subscribed and sworn to before me, the Plaintiff, Ronald F.
Bellonio, who verified that the foregoing information is true and
correct to the best of his information, knowledge and belief, on
this
/(-t*" day of June, 1993.

S1C9SCC«':\

SaJt Lake City. •
Wy Ccmmisi;:
September'
Ssioc:-.

ROTARY PUBLIC

2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing Notice of Intent was
served by U.S. Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested, postage
pregjj.d, upon each of the following on the
// ^<
day of
. / LX yiC
/ 1993.
Jan Graham, Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Salt-Lake City Corporation
Roger Cutler, City Attorney
451 South State, #505
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Salt Lake City Airport Authority
Louis Miller, Director
AMF Box 22084
Salt Lake City, Utah 84122
R.M. Kern, Esq.
Kern & Wooley
10920 Wilshire Boulevard
Los Angeles, California 90024

RONALD F. BfiLLONIO
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FEB 0 6 1995
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.».^....f

CLARK A. HARMS (#5713)
EARL SPAFTORD & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Trolley Corners, Suite 3-A
515 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
(801) 363-1234
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Z*Gu?;C*aL

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RON BELLONIO,
Plaintiff,
vs,
SALT LAKE AIRPORT AUTHORITY,
and SALT LAKE CITY,
Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART,
AND DENYING IN PART,
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS
Case No. 940903841
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER came on for hearing before the
above Coxirt on Friday, January 13, 1995, on Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint and causes of actions herein
against each of the named Defendants.
Plaintiff was present, and was represented by his attorney,
Clark A. Harms.

Defendants were each represented by thheir

attorney, Roger H. Bullock, of the law firm of Strong & Hanni,
P.C.

The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Third District Court

Judge, presided*
The matter was called, and the respective arguments of
counsel were presented.

Based upon the pleadings and arguments

of the parties and their respective counsel, the Court ORDERS as
follows:
1.

Based upon Plaintiff's non-opposition, the SALT LAKE

AIRPORT AUTHORITY, being a division of, and not a separate entity
from Salt Lake City Corporation, said SALT LAKE AIRPORT AUTHORITY
is hereby dismissed as a party and as a Defendant herein; and
2.

Defendant SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION'S Motion to

Dismiss is hereby denied.
DATED this

c

1995.

day of
BY THE COURT

JOMER* F. WILKINSON
District Judge

r

Approved as to form:
STRONG S HaNNI, P.C.

ROCE* 'HV^HLLOCK
Attorney for Defendants

ff:\login\belloaio\ dismiss.ord
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